Abstract-The generic matrix multiply (GEMM) routine comprises the compute and memory-intensive parts of many information retrieval, machine learning, and object recognition systems that process integer inputs. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to ensure that integer GEMM computations remain robust to silent data corruptions (SDCs), which stem from accidental voltage or frequency overscaling, or other hardware nonidealities. In this paper, we introduce a new method for SDC mitigation based on the concept of numerical packing. The key difference between our approach and all existing methods is the production of redundant results within the numerical representation of the outputs, rather than as a separate set of checksums. Importantly, unlike well-known algorithm-based fault tolerance approaches for GEMM, the proposed approach can reliably detect the locations of the vast majority of all possible SDCs in the results of GEMM computations. An experimental investigation of voltage-scaled integer GEMM computations for visual descriptor matching within state-of-the-art image and video retrieval algorithms running on an Intel i7-4578U 3 GHz processor shows that SDC mitigation based on numerical packing leads to comparable or lower execution and energy-consumption overhead in comparison with all other alternatives.
However, to ensure that processors remain reliable, strong error detection and correction mechanisms are required, especially for the case of silent data corruptions (SDCs), i.e., soft errors (occurring primarily on DRAM [2] , [55] ) that remain undetected because they do not lead to a system halt or crash. This is now a challenge of increasing importance for prevalent applications in mobile, desktop, and highperformance multimedia systems [20] , [40] , [56] , [59] , [62] , where SDCs affecting critical data sections [38] , [55] can result in incorrect outputs or cause the system to behave unexpectedly. Therefore, reliability measures, such as caches with hardware-supported error-correction codes (ECCs), are now becoming the norm in most processor designs. However, the constantly increasing SDC rates along with the complex corruption patterns (e.g., burst errors and multibit upsets) found in aggressively scaled systems require increasingly sophisticated ECC methods, which are known to incur very substantial area, performance, and power overheads [3] , [45] , [48] . This is why the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Exascale computing study [34] put forward that mitigation of SDC bursts should also be based on fault-tolerant software/algorithmic designs rather than solely depending on expensive circuit-level techniques [34] . This has led to a growing number of research proposals for developing cross-layer system reliability designs [14] , [45] , which ensure that systems remain reliable under unreliable hardware.
Mitigation techniques for SDCs are especially important for matrix products performed during descriptor matching, power iterations, backpropagation, transform decompositions, random projections, kernel methods, covariance matrix calculations, and block Lanczos iterations within information retrieval, object detection and tracking, machine learning, and classification applications [8] [9] [10] , [12] , [15] , [16] , [20] , [29] , [35] , [40] , [52] , [56] , [59] , [62] . This is because: 1) matrix-product computations comprise the bulk of processing in such applications and 2) subsequent processing stages apply low-complex-yet-noise-sensitive thresholding, sorting, and clustering operations [29] , [33] , [38] , [44] , and any undetected SDCs in the matrix-product stage can have severe repercussions in the final results. Many such matrix products utilize integer inputs and are typically performed with an integer generic matrix multiply (GEMM) routine, or the single-or double-precision floating-point GEMM (sGEMM or dGEMM) routines of a high-performance mathematics kernel library (MKL) [22] , [28] . Thus, ensuring that integer matrix products remain reliable against SDCs is of paramount importance for such multimedia systems.
A. Summary of Prior Work
Existing techniques that can ensure reliability to SDCs comprise two categories: 1) algorithm-based fault tolerance 1 (ABFT)-i.e., methods using checksums specifically tailored to the algorithm under consideration-that can reliably detect (and possibly correct) up to a limited number of SDCs [13] , [17] , [19] , [25] , [39] , [46] , [47] , [60] and 2) systems with dual modular redundancy (DMR), where all noncoinciding SDCs can be detected if the same operation is duplicated in two separate processors (or threads) that cross-validate their results [21] , but SDCs cannot be corrected without using triple modular redundancy (TMR) [23] .
It is well known that DMR/TMR solutions lead to substantial processing overhead in hardware/software systems and incur increased energy consumption [21] . On the other hand, while ABFT in GEMM comes with limited implementation overhead [25] , it can only detect the locations of a limited number of SDCs (typically up to one or two) for an entire GEMM computation. To address this issue, modified ABFT (mABFT) schemes were proposed [13] , [17] , [30] , [31] , [39] , [41] , [47] , [54] , [61] , which are designed to locate and correct more SDCs per GEMM. However, mABFT approaches incur considerable implementation overhead and significant reduction in available bitwidth for integer GEMM results [13] , [17] , [30] , [31] , [39] , [41] , [47] , [54] , [61] . In conjunction with recent studies indicating that SDCs in large cache memories tend to increase drastically under voltage overscaling [2] , [43] , [45] , these observations indicate that ABFT and mABFT may ultimately not be the most efficient approaches to detect arbitrary SDC patterns occurring in GEMM computations under increased rates of transient hardware faults.
B. Contribution
The proposed method detects any number of SDCs in integer matrix products by creating redundant results within the numerical representation of the output results. This is achieved by packing pairs of inputs within one integer number and performing two complementary quarter-size GEMM calls. Beyond the desired outputs, these products spontaneously create numerically entangled pairs of outputs within the numerical representation of the results. All outputs are then extracted and, in conjunction with a very low-complex rowcolumn ABFT check, are cross-validated with the numerically entangled outputs to detect arbitrary SDCs with very high probability.
Calculations of computational complexity, as well as experimental results on an Intel Sandy Bridge processor, demonstrate that the average execution time overhead of the proposed method against high-performance, fault-intolerant, GEMM realizations under SDC-free conditions is limited to 11.50%. Therefore, the reliability and execution time efficiency of our method are comparable to that of ABFT and, unlike ABFT, our method is capable of detecting the locations of the vast majority of all possible SDCs. This makes our method superior to ABFT, mABFT, and DMR under the occurrence of multiple SDCs in memory. Finally, via an SDC-injection campaign using an open source low-level virtual machine (LLVM)-based fault injection tool, the Kontrollable Utah LLVM Fault Injector (KULFI) [49] , [50] , we demonstrate that our proposal paves the way for a new class of SDC mitigation methods for integer matrix products that are fast, energy efficient, and highly reliable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we summarize the operation of high-performance GEMM routines with different variants of ABFT and highlight their differences with the proposed approach. In Section III, we describe the proposed approach starting from the previously proposed concept of numerical packing. Sections IV and V-B provide performance results and results with a voltage-scaled platform, and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. HIGH-PERFORMANCE GEMM, ABFT, AND mABFT
Consider the GEMM design depicted in Fig. 1(a) , which follows the general structure found in optimized MKL designs [22] . The application calls GEMM for an M × K by K × N matrix multiplication which is further subdivided into L × L inner-kernel matrix products. For our approach,
with SIMD bits being the number of bits of each SIMD register (SIMD bits = 256 in this work) and b repr ∈ {32, 64} the number of bits for floating-point or integer representations. The innerkernel result 2 R 2,1 of the example shown in Fig. 1(a) comprises the sum of multiple subblock multiplications A 2,l B l,1
If the matrices' dimensions are not multiples of L, some cleanup code [22] is applied at the borders to complete the inner-kernel results of the overall matrix multiplication. This separation into top-level processing and subblock-level processing is done for efficient cache utilization. Specifically, during the initial data access of GEMM for top-level processing, data in matrices A and B are reordered into block major format: for each L × L pair of subblocks A i,l and B l, j multiplied to produce inner-kernel result
, the input data within A i,l and B l, j are reordered in rowwise and columnwise raster manner, respectively. Thus, sequential data accesses are performed during each subblock matrix multiplication and this enables the use of SIMD instructions, thereby leading to significant acceleration.
From this description, it is evident that the top-level processing simply administers the computation (and, optionally, error detection) at the subblock level and the core operations are performed within each subblock independently, before being aggregated to produce the final results. Therefore, in the remainder of the paper we present ABFT, mABFT, and our approach in reference to a single subblock matrix product. For notational simplicity, we remove the indices from each subblock product A i,l B l, j . Moreover, despite the block-major format reordering, we retain the 2D indexing in the equations to facilitate intuitive understanding of the proposed method.
A. Algorithm-Based Fault Tolerance
All ABFT methods specifically tailored for GEMM computations [13] , [17] , [25] , [60] , [61] append the input subblocks with (redundant) checksum vectors (rows or columns), denoted by a c , b r in Fig. 1(b) and highlighted in color.
In the ABFT approach proposed by Huang and Abraham [25] , a single checksum row and column per subblock is used for error detection and correction. Specifically, checksum vector a c is the sum across each column of A. Checksum vector b r is the sum across each row of B. Under the described configuration of Fig. 1(b) , the result of the checksum-appended subblock GEMM, R f = A f B f , can be checked for the detection and correction of any single SDC within the subblock product R [13] , [17] , [25] , [61] . Specifically: 1) the sum of each row and each column of R (which is contained within R f ) is validated against the corresponding checksum elements of r r and r c and 2) the sum of the checksum vectors themselves is validated against r rc . If these validations fail for a certain row and column, the index of this row and column indicates the location of the SDC within R f .
However, when multiple SDCs occur within a subblock multiplication, ABFT cannot pinpoint their exact locations and requires recomputation of results, which is termed as rollback ABFT' [1] . For example, given the ±ε and δ error pattern shown in Fig. 2 , ABFT flags locations r 3,1 and r 3,3 as erroneous, while two other erroneous locations, r 1,1 and r 1, 3 go undetected due to the cancellation effect of the given error pattern. Therefore, when multiple SDCs are detected, the only reliable method for recovery via ABFT is to recompute (i.e., rollback) the entirety of the rows and columns that have been detected as erroneous. If a substantial number of SDCs is detected, this will result in entire GEMM subblock recomputation, i.e., complete execution rollback, incurring significant execution time penalty.
Finally, due to the fact that the checksum inputs a c and b r are the columnwise or rowwise summation of inputs, the elements of the row and column checksums, r r and r c , will have increased dynamic range by log 2 L bits for an L × L by L × L integer GEMM. In addition, given that r rc is the sum of the elements of r r and r c , this element will require 2 log 2 L additional bits. Therefore, in comparison to the conventional (fault-intolerant) GEMM computation and for L = 288 and 32-b integer representations, ABFT incurs a loss of
of output dynamic range in order to accommodate all checksum results.
B. Modified Algorithm-Based Fault Tolerance
More recently, modified ABFT methods were proposed that make use of additional checksums, constructed with specific weight vectors. The number of additional checksums and their dynamic range is dependent on the desired detectability. [30] , [47] per row and column of a subblock product. This comes at the cost of increasing the size of the checksum matrices d times. An illustration of a subblock product with d = 2 is given in Fig. 1(c) .
In more detail, the first checksum of each column of A and row of B is one of the original ABFTs; we refer to this as the unweighted checksum, a c1 and b r1 , respectively. For an mABFT approach with d = 2, the second checksum of each column of A and row of B (denoted by a c2 and b r2 , respectively) is the inner product of the column of A (respectively, inner product of the row of B). Jou and Abraham [30] proposed the weight vector w exp given by
However, due to the exponential increase of the dynamic range of a c2 and b r2 , the use of w exp will cause overflow problems under 32-b or 64-b integer representations. Such an mABFT approach is therefore mostly of theoretical interest, rather than of practical relevance to conventional numerical representations used in programmable processors. As a remedy to the dynamic range expansion caused by the weight vector of (4), Rexford and Jha [47] proposed further partitioning of input subblocks into smaller blocks. Complementary to this approach, Luk [39] and Stefanidis and Margaritis [54] proposed the weights
instead of w exp of (4) in order to allow for quadratic increase of dynamic range in a c2 and b r2 and quartic increase of dynamic range for the second row-column checksum element, r r2c2 . Specifically, the quartic increase in the latter is by factor (
Their work shows that, under the use of w linear and for d = 2, up to two SDCs per row or column of a subblock can be reliably detected and up to one SDC can be reliably corrected. Therefore, the combination of partitioning of L × L subblocks into P × P blocks with P = 16, d = 2, and the length-P linear weights w linear (with L replaced by P) allows for mABFT to operate with 32-b representations. However, this comes at the loss of
of output dynamic range for integer representations in comparison with the conventional (fault-intolerant) GEMM computation.
III. PROPOSED FAULT-TOLERANT NUMERICAL PACKING IN GEMM
Packed processing has been proposed for throughputprecision scaling of GEMM computations in our previous work [6] . Since the proposed method is built upon the concept of packing [6] , this is briefly summarized here. To facilitate the exposition, we shall be referring to the illustrations of Fig. 4 , which present the steps of the described methods for the elementary case of a 2 × 2 matrix produced via a 2 × 1 by 1 × 2 vector product. In addition, the conventional (fault-intolerant) approach is illustrated in Fig. 3(a) -(c). Finally, beyond this elementary case, our analytical exposition will be based on the general case of an L × L subblock product.
A. Review of Packing in Integer Subblock Matrix Multiplication
In packing for integer subblock multiplication R = AB, only one input subblock is packed, i.e., either A or B. This selection does not affect the performance in the case of GEMM, as both subblocks have been reordered in blockmajor format. Assuming A is chosen, the packing process creates blockÂ with
where k is the utilized packing coefficient, k ∈ N . The utilized value for k depends on the maximum possible value of the matrix product, as will be elaborated in the following. An illustration of the packing of (7) for the two elements of a 2 × 1 vector a is given in Fig. 3(d) , i.e., for n =m = 0. Notice that (7) operates along the columns ofÂ in order to pack rows 2m and 2m + 1 together. This means that, in order to use integer SIMD instructions for accelerated computation of (7), we can group (SIMD bits /b repr ) consecutive elements of each row and apply each multiply-accumulate (MAC) operation of (7) to them with one SIMD instruction. Once (7) is completed, processing occurs viaR =ÂB (∀m,
The packed output of (8) contains both rows of the results, r 2m,n andr 2m+1,n , packed together. An example is shown in Fig. 3 (f) for n =m = 0. Importantly, if they do not overlap in the packed representation and the numerical representation used can accommodate both packed outputs, both rows can be computed concurrently via (8) . For the packed processing of two inputs shown in (7) and (8), these two conditions are met when the packing coefficient satisfies the following constraint [4] [5] [6] .
for 32/64-b GEMM (integer or floating point) can be used for the computation of (8) . Following the completion of the processing, unpacking of the results can be performed by the following process
The first output, r 2m+1,n , which is packed at the most significant bits ofrm ,n , is extracted by r 2m,n =rm ,n k.
The extracted output is then removed fromrm ,n
The result is then converted into its signed representation.
Finally if r 2m+1,n < 0, then the result extracted from the most significant bits must be incremented by one, i.e., r 2m,n ← ( r 2m,n + 1).
B. Proposed Fault-Tolerant Packing
We utilize the packing concept in order to provide highly reliable integer matrix products within each GEMM call. Our method uses standard 64-b integer representations and off-the-shelf GEMM subblock kernels to process 32-b inputs, as detailed in the following.
1) Packing Process:
The proposed approach performs two packings of matrix A intoÂ i andÂ j and one packing of B intoB, as shown in the example of Fig. 4(a) . The figure illustrates only the case of an elementary 2 × 1 by 1 × 2 vector product with k = 10 and, due to the small input vector dimensions, the packed matrices are in fact scalarsâ i ,â j andb. For the general case of an L × L by L × L subblock product, the process is identical for all other pairs of inputs within A and B and is expressed by (∀m, n :
Each packing stacks two inputs together in a single 64-b integer number (assuming 32-b inputs) and can be done during initial reading and reordering of each subblock in GEMM [6] , [22] . Notice that, in comparison with conventional packing presented in the previous section [and illustrated in Fig. 3(d)-(g) ], the following hold true. 1) (11) and (12) invert the sign of the elements of A that are left shifted by k-bits. 2) A is packed twice with reverse ordering, as shown in (11) and (12). 3) B is packed as well. This setup enables packed processing to be used for error detection.
2
) subblock multiplications ensue via the use of two standard subblock GEMM calls (using either 64-b integer or 64-b floating point representation), producing all required results, as well as a number of entangled results within the numerical representation of the packed outputs. An example of the two packed products of elementary 2×1 by 1×2 vectors is shown in Fig. 4(b) and (c). For the general case of an L × L by L ×L subblock product, the elements packed withinR i andR j are expressed mathematically by (∀m, n :
3) Unpacking of the Results: Subsequently, unpacking occurs within each element ofR i andR j based on the process presented below, which extends the unpacking of the previous section in order to handle the three packed results within each outputr i,m,n andr j,m,n , illustrated in Fig. 4(d) .
We extract the components packed withinr i following the unpacking process described in the previous section, with
indicating the entanglement (i.e., superposition within the representation) of elements r k 0 ,k 1 and r k 2 ,k 3 . The first output, r 2m,2n , which is packed at the most significant bits ofr i , is extracted by
The extracted output is then removed fromr i and relevant bitwise operations ensue to determine the sign of the entangled output,ε (2m,2n+1),(2m+1,2n) . We present the details of this sign check by defining two parameters, t i,1 and t i,2 , as outlined below
. Subsequently, the intermediate result extracted by (18) is also removed from the packed representation and a similar check is performed in order to extract the signed representation of r 2m+1,2n+1 , that is
If
We extract the components packed withinr j via the following process, which is identical to the process described forr i :
If sufficient spacing is provisioned via the packing coefficient k so that no overlapping (or invasion) of results occurs within the numerical representation [4] [5] [6] and all three packed results fit within the utilized numerical representation, then the results are guaranteed to be recoverable.
Relating to the second requirement, if 3k ≤ W , then the unpacking process determines the correct value of each output. This condition imposes the following. 1) k ≤ 21 for W = 64 in 64-b integer GEMM. Given that the sum of two outputs must be accommodated for the packed results shifted by k-bits (i.e., the entangled results) and one bit must be provided to allow for the sign information to be preserved within the packed integer representation, this allows for up to ±2 19 output dynamic range without any approximation. This means that 12 b of dynamic range are sacrificed in comparison to 32-b integer GEMM that allows for up to ±2 31 b, i.e., loss of 37.5% of the bitwidth. This loss is substantially smaller than the corresponding bitwidth loss of ABFT and mABFT, reported in (3) and (6), respectively. Since the computational complexity and error detectability of the proposed algorithm is independent of the packing factor, we set k to the maximum achievable value, i.e., k = 20 and k = 9 for 64-and 32-bit integer processing, respectively. Further details on the mathematics of the analytic calculation of the maximum packing factor are found in related work [4] [5] [6] .
4) Error Detection by Postentanglement Followed by RowColumn ABFT Checksum Validation:
The advantage of the proposed packing-based GEMM is that we not only obtain the results, but can also validate them by postentangling, i.e., doing r 2m,2n+1 − r 2m +1,2n and r 2m +1,2n+1 − r 2m,2n and comparing these with the entangled resultsε (2m,2n+1), (2m+1,2n) andε (2m+1,2n+1),(2m,2n) , respectively. An example is shown in Fig. 4(d) and (e) form =n = 0. If differences are detected, the higher level routine (top-level processing) can be notified and a decision can be made by the application on whether to recompute the erroneous results or not.
One weakness of the postentanglement check is that, however unlikely, it is still possible that an SDC occurs in a location in the packed resultsR i andR j in a way that the operation r 2m,2n+1 − r 2m+1,2n or r 2m+1,2n+1 − r 2m,2n does not detect it. Specifically, this would be the case if both the extracted results r 2m,2n+1 and r 2m+1,2n were affected by an additive noise term δ, with δ ∈ Z . To detect the occurrence of such pathological cases, we simply utilize the conventional row-column ABFT checksum by calculating a single inner product between the sum of the columns of A and the sum of the rows of B
which, similar to ABFT, can be derived during the input subblock reordering. Then, after checking for SDCs based on the postentanglement check (and recalculating all detected SDCs), we can check if r rc produced by (24) agrees with the sum of all the elements of R:
It is straightforward to derive the latter when the output matrix is returned via a raster scan and summation. This checksum ensures that no such SDCs remain undetected. The overall ABFT-based row-column checksum process requires producing only a single checksum per integer matrix product, i.e., r rc of (24), and simply adding the results in the order they are returned to the top-level processing of GEMM. Our experiments will demonstrate that the overall error checking process (packing, unpacking, postentanglement check and row-column ABFT checksum) incurs execution time overhead similar to that of ABFT.
C. Theoretical Analysis
The following two propositions summarize the arithmetic operations (addition, multiplication, and comparison) for the computation of the proposed method for SDC mitigation in GEMM in reference to ABFT, mABFT and DMR. Note that the operation counts for the proposed approach have been scaled by two to account for the fact that the use of doublebitwidth representations (due to the use of packing) reduces the processing throughput by a factor of two.
Proposition 1: In the absence of SDCs within an L × L GEMM output, the number of arithmetic operations of the proposed method is the following:
For example, for L = 576, Proposition 1 shows that numerical packing is only 0.95% less efficient than ABFT, while remaining 20.37% and 49.20% more efficient than mABFT and DMR, respectively.
Proposition 2: Given x SDCs in output GEMM results, the number of arithmetic operations of the proposed method for the GEMM computation followed by error detection and correction, and averaged between the best and worst case of SDC patterns, is the following:
·100% less than that of ABFT; 2)
· 100% less than that of mABFT; 3)
· 100% less than that of DMR. Proof: See Appendix I. By setting L = 576 and x = 10, Proposition 2 estimates that numerical packing is 32.86%, 20.36%, and 49.19% more efficient than ABFT, mABFT, and DMR, respectively. Overall, the complexity analysis of Propositions 1 and 2 indicates that our proposal is expected to incur small penalty when no SDCs happen, and become highly beneficial when multiple SDCs occur in GEMM.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present execution time results with an Intel i7-3632QM 2.2 GHz processor (Ivy Bridge architecture with AVX support, Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS, Clang 3.2 compiler). The BLAS routine of the ATLAS math library was used for all GEMM calls (sGEMM and dGEMM for 64 b). 3 After experimenting with various subblock sizes, we selected six subblock sizes as representative cases, ranging from 32 × 32 (below which the use of sGEMM or dGEMM is not beneficial) to 1152 ×1152. We opted for subblock sizes that are multiples of the subblock size settings for sGEMM and dGEMM within most open-source MKLs (e.g., ATLAS and GOTO) and avoid the use of cleanup code for the borders.
The ABFT approach follows Huang and Abraham [25] , while we implemented the mABFT following Rexford and Jha [47] , with the linear weighted checksum vector [39] , [54] of (5). We opted for partition block size of 16 × 16 within each subblock in order to achieve output dynamic range comparable to the proposed approach and at the same time limit the overhead caused by the two additional checksum rows and columns per block. 4 For the ABFT implementation, due to the detection limitations analyzed in Section II-A, entire rows and columns are recomputed when multiple SDCs are detected. In addition, when ten SDCs are detected in different rows and columns, the error detection process stops and entire GEMM subblock recomputation (i.e., complete rollback) is carried out, as this turns out to be less costly than complete detection and multirow & column recomputation for the chosen subblock sizes.
A. SDC Injection Technique
In order to investigate the performance of all presented approaches for the detection and correction of soft errors, we perform an artificial fault injection campaign using the open source LLVM [37] based fault injection tool, KULFI [50] . KULFI emulates faults occurring in CPU state elements, which usually manifest as bit flips in a random computational state chosen at runtime by injecting faults at the intermediate representation (IR) code of LLVM. Because the LLVM IR code preserves variable and function names and supports program analysis and transformations, it allows for controlled fault injections to be performed at specific program points and into specific instructions. Given that such flips are somewhat rare in computing systems today, KULFI injects a single transient fault during every execution under investigation, albeit at a random time instance. By selecting fault injection parameters 5 as outlined in the author's example code [49] , we observe and characterize the effect of the injected faults during GEMM computation into three classes. 3 Since all optimized math kernel libraries today support only 32/64-b floating-point number representations, we cast all integer inputs into floatingpoint data type after preprocessing while casting to integer data type in order to perform error check and correction if required. 4 Specifically, we found that, under P = 8, the overhead caused by mABFT is more than 150% in comparison to the fault-intolerant original GEMM and P = 32 or higher leads to unacceptable loss of dynamic range, as illustrated by (6) . 5 Namely, the following parameters are used for all our fault injection executions: iteration=100; byte_position=random; expected_fault_ count=10; total_fault_count=100; inject_once flag=1; static_ fault/dynamic_fault=1; inject_pointer_error=0; inject_data_ error=1; print_fault_site=0 
1) Benign Errors:
Errors that have no effect on the GEMM output. 2) Single SDC: Errors that affect a data element which is not reused during the GEMM computation. 3) Single-Row SDC: Errors that affect a data element which is used to compute an entire row/column of GEMM. For example, a typical error summary when performing 100 fault injection executions (excluding segmentation and out-ofbound faults) of an N × N-by-N × N GEMM is given by In order to keep track of the number of injected errors that manifest as SDCs, KULFI performs two executions of a given source code: error-free and error-prone executions. We design the error-free execution to implement optimized GEMM calls (using the cblas_sgemm and cblas_dgemm functions of the ATLAS library), while the error-prone GEMM implementation is written in plain C code in such a way as to allow for error injection during GEMM. In this way, GEMM execution time reported in Table I is measured from the error-free implementation while the performance for preand postprocessing (including error correction) is measured from the error-prone execution.
B. Results Under SDCs
The average execution time out of several independent runs (each using randomly generated inputs) is presented in Table I . For all the reported experiments, all methods detected incurred errors (i.e., the detection rate was 1.0 for all approaches). Therefore, the reported results compare the different methods with respect to execution time. To present a detailed breakdown of the execution time performance of the components of the proposed approach, four subcases are shown: 1) only the cost of dGEMM calls (i.e., not the cost of packing, unpacking, or error checking); 2) everything when no SDCs occur; 3) everything, including error checking and correction when one SDC occurs; and 4) everything, including the detection and correction of one row of SDCs injected using the KULFI tool.
Theoretically, the execution time for GEMM computation (without error tolerance) is expected to be equal for the conventional sGEMM and the two quatersize dGEMMs perfomed by the proposed approach (see proof of Section III-C). In practice, due to the internal kernel optimizations of the ATLAS MKL for different matrix inner blocks, the results of Table I show both positive and negative GEMM execution time overhead for the proposed approach, which subsequently affects the overall overhead for error tolerance for the presented matrix sizes. Overall, the results show that, against fault-intolerant (conventional) GEMM design, the proposed approach incurs execution time overhead between −24.70% and 43.20% when no SDCs occur and 2.41% and 49.94% when mitigating up to N SDCs in an N × N GEMM output. On average, 12.05% to 21.21% overhead is incurred by the proposed scheme for tolerating up to N SDCs in GEMM for the presented matrix sizes. Similarly, Table I shows that ABFT incurs an average execution time overhead 6 of 12.64% to 120.34% for the same level of fault tolerance. Overall, it is evident from the results of Table I that the proposed method incurs comparable overhead to ABFT when no errors occur and this overhead is (approximately) 18.04% and 46.37% less than that of mABFT-and DMR-based GEMM. These results are in line with the theoretical predictions of Proposition 1, and as expected by the theoretical analysis of Section III-C, the percentile overhead of all methods tends to decrease with increased subblock length (with some fluctuation for small subblock sizes due to internal kernel optimizations of the utilized ATLAS library).
For execution time overhead when correcting SDCs, the results of Table I show that the performance of ABFT could be worse than modular redundancy in multiple SDC scenarios. Specifically, while the proposed algorithms, mABFT and DMR, incur very low overhead for the correction of detected SDCs, ABFT requires (on average) more than 50% additional overhead for error correction. This is because, under multiple detected SDCs in GEMM, ABFT recomputes several rows and columns of the result, or indeed the entire GEMM subblock when ten erroneous rows/colums are detected (rollback ABFT [1] ). This significant increase in the incurred overhead is also evident in the theoretical analysis of Proposition 2. It is also evident that the additional overhead for tolerating multiple SDCs decreases considerably for all approaches, with the exception of ABFT, as the matrix size increases. For example, numerical packing requires 53.01% additional overhead to tolerate multiple SDCs for the 32 × 32 matrix, while requiring only 9.07% to tolerate the same proportion of SDCs in the 1152 × 1152 matrix. This property is shared among all exact error-location algorithms (like numerical packing and DMR) and is beneficial as the requirements for low-cost SDC correction techniques are more significant for large matrix sizes, where entire GEMM recomputation would lead to substantial performance degradation.
In terms of error detection, by injecting independent and uniformly distributed (IUD) bit flips in all the outputs of the two GEMM calls of the proposed approach (in the integer case) under an extensive SDC campaign of more than 10 trillion combinations, we verified experimentally that the locations of all SDCs were indeed detectable by the proposed approach. On the contrary, as detailed in Section II, ABFT can reliably detect and correct only up to a single SDC within each subblock product. ABFT requires recomputation of entire rows and columns to ensure that no SDCs remain uncorrected, 6 The performance results for ABFT are in line with previously reported ABFT benchmarks in GEMM. For example, Bosilca et al. [13] , report that checkpointing the system state to detect a single SDC per process (and rolling back to a previous state when SDCs are detected) leads to 9%-34% time overhead for an implementation using up to 484 processes. Similarly, Chen et al. [17] report that for detecting a single SDC per subblock of a large matrix operation, 4%-9% execution time overhead is incurred in a ScaLAPACK implementation over a distributed computing system. Finally, Wunderlich et al. [61] report that ABFT incurs 18%-45% execution time overhead versus GEMM on medium to large matrix dimensions under a graphics processing unit (GPU) implementation.
as discussed in the example of Fig. 2 . This is circumvented via the use of mABFT, which, under the utilized settings, can reliably detect the locations of up to 32 SDCs per GEMM subblock, albeit at the cost of substantial execution time overhead.
Overall, our theoretical analysis and experimental results demonstrate that our proposal offers very high accuracy and reliability in the detection of the locations of SDCs, while it comes with runtime overhead that is similar to that of ABFT when no SDCs occur.
V. APPLICATION IN ENERGY-AWARE COMPUTING SYSTEMS UNDER VOLTAGE SCALING FOR VISUAL DESCRIPTOR MATCHING IN IMAGE AND VIDEO RETRIEVAL
Voltage overscaling has been proposed as the means to improve battery life in portable devices, albeit at the risk of exposing the execution to transient faults in memory [32] , [42] , [63] . For example, Narayanan and Xie [42] report that dropping the operating voltage of a 4 Mb-SRAM memory for 1 h brings significant energy savings but also increases the number of memory errors from 57 to 658. Our approach can be used as the fault detection and mitigation framework when applying such a scenario within integer matrix products of multimedia applications. It may be argued that, because multimedia applications are inherently error tolerant [7] , SDCs would always have a benign effect on the output results. However, recent studies [24] , [38] , [44] show that there exist critical sections of multimedia applications where mitigation of soft errors is imperative, especially when outputs from such sections are reused for subsequent computations. In view of this, in the next two sections we present such an example within the context of state-of-the-art image and video retrieval algorithms and we also showcase the corresponding energy savings obtained when SDC-tolerant algorithms are used in a vulnerable voltage-overscaled environment.
A. Effect of SDCs on the Results of an Image or Video Retrieval Task
Consider a large image database preprocessed using the state-of-the-art vector of locally aggregated descriptors (VLAD) method of Jégou et al. [29] to produce a compact descriptor for each database image comprising N integers, with N ∈ [288, 1152]. The database images could be standalone pictures or consist of frames of several video sequences. In order to match a given query image (or video frame) with the database images, an inner product between the compact descriptor of the query image and the descriptor of each of the images in the database is computed [29] . Given that multiple query images (also known as image bunch) are matched through the stored database at any given moment (e.g., because of many concurrent users, or due to the use of video that results in multiple feature vectors per query), the matching operations are carried out via GEMM products between the descriptors of query image bunches and the ones of the database images.
In order to see the impact of SDCs in such a framework, we consider matching a query bunch comprising N image Indicative image matches (from the Holidays data set [29] ) in VLAD-based image retrieval when using the query image on the left for (a) error-free case and (b) a single-row erroneous case.
descriptors within 1000 segments of N database descriptors each (i.e., 1000 N ×N-by-N ×N GEMMs) with the descriptors extracted from the Holidays data set [29] . The experiment is set to establish the differences occurring in the retrieved images when running under SDC-free conditions versus when running under KULFI's single-row SDC case of Table I . We present an illustration of returned matches in both errorfree and erroneous cases in Fig. 5 . The average difference in the obtained results for various bunch sizes is presented in Table II . It is evident that the compact nature of the image descriptors (which makes them sensitive to errors) leads to nearly 30% discrepancy between the error-free and the SDC execution of the descriptors. This results in irrelevant images being retrieved, as shown in Fig. 5 . Therefore, in such image and video retrieval experiments, mitigation of SDCs is imperative in order to maintain reliable system operation.
B. Application in Energy-Aware Computing Systems Under Voltage Scaling Incurring High SDC Rates in Data Cache Memory
We present an example of the efficacy of our proposal as a power saving technique within systems where it is imperative to ensure reliable performance at reduced energy consumption.
Voltage scaling is commonly found today within poweraware computing for multimedia systems [26] . Recently, voltage overscaling has been proposed as the means for achieving substantial reduction in energy consumption at the cost of transient cell failures in large memory arrays (e.g., data caches) [2] , [58] . We thus assume that the fault-intolerant parts of the multimedia processing algorithm (including data input, packing-for the proposed approach-and postcomputation error detection and correction) operate at V safe V, which ensures that no SDCs occur at runtime, albeit at the cost of high power dissipation. However, the fault-tolerant parts (i.e., the GEMM calls) operate under scaled voltage V error V (with V error < V safe ), selected such that transient cell failures are occasionally encountered within the utilized data cache, while instruction cache is protected by on-chip variablestrength error-correcting codes that leave no errors exposed to the operating system and application layers [2] .
C. Application Context
We performed experiments where ABFT, mABFT, DMR, and the proposed approach are used to detect SDCs within the GEMM operations of the image retrieval task described in Section V-A for database segment sizes of 576 and 1152 images, and each image in the database represented by a descriptor comprising 576 and 1152 integers, respectively.
D. System Description and SDC Injection
The experiments were performed on an Intel i7-4578U 3 GHz processor (Windows 8.1, Intel C++ Compiler 15.0.1). The Intel Extreme Tuning Utility was used for all voltage adjustments in our experiments and the Intel Power Gadget API [27] was used to measure the dynamic CPU power dissipation for the different approaches. We selected V safe = 1.37 V for SDC-free operation and V error = 0.98 V for overscaling. The chosen value for V error is below the recommended voltage for our system, but was still found to be providing for safe operation. Further overscaling causes actual SDCs in our setup, but does not allow for any control in our experimental conditions. Therefore, in common with related work [33] , [36] , [51] , [57] , we opted to operate our platform at a safe voltage level and then inject SDCs artificially with probabilities of 10 −4 and 10 −5 per data cache access. 7 Thus, on average, one SDC occurs every 10 000 and 100 000 accesses during each GEMM computation, respectively. This ensures that all methods undergo the same SDC injection campaign. In summary, the chosen experimental setup emulates the case where the fault-tolerant parts of the application (operating at V error V) are exposed to data-cache SDCs that are detected and corrected at runtime.
E. Energy Consumption Results
Table III shows the average CPU energy for different approaches. Due to the increased number of recomputations of ABFT, its performance drops with increased SDC rates. Table III shows that the proposed approach provides for up to 35% reduction in energy consumption against the faultintolerant GEMM and up to 96% reduction against the other alternatives. This is because of the following. 1) Like DMR, it achieves highly reliable detection of the locations of the vast majority of all the erroneous computations, while ABFT requires row and column recomputations given that, beyond the case of a single SDC per GEMM subblock, it cannot pinpoint the SDC locations precisely (Fig. 2) .
2) It has substantially reduced overhead in comparison to DMR-and mABFT-based GEMM and its processing cycles are comparable to that of the fault-intolerant GEMM. It can thus be considered as the best approach for SDC mitigation under aggressive voltage scaling in integer GEMM operations within energy-aware computing systems.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a new class of methods for highly reliable integer matrix products. Our approach inserts redundancy within the numerical representation of the inputs by exploiting the concept of numerical packing. Analysis and validation of our proposal using high-performance GEMM routines demonstrated that high reliability comes at the cost of certain bitwidth loss and limited execution time overhead in comparison to the equivalent fault-intolerant GEMM. A summary of the features, requirements, and performance of the proposed method in reference to ABFT, mABFT, and DMR is given in Table IV . The summary shows that on average: 1) under no SDCs in the GEMM execution, our approach incurs only 2.51% higher overhead than ABFT, and is 18.04% and 46.37% more efficient than mABFT and DMR, respectively, and 2) under a single-row data corruption emanating from the use of a fault injection tool, KULFI, the proposed approach is 17% to 47% more efficient than all other methods, as it can pinpoint the locations of all detected SDCs. In terms of energy consumption requirements, based on an emulated SDC-injection campaign incurred in data cache memory under voltage overscaling, we show that the proposed approach performs best in comparison to all other approaches. Future work will investigate alternative forms of numerical packing and their feasibility for SDC mitigation within broader classes of numerical computations.
APPENDIX I PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: Given two L × L matrices A and B, the proposed method requires (3L 2 /2) addition/subtraction operations [see (11)-(13) ignoring all arithmetic shift operations] to generate the (L/2) × (L/2) packed matricesÂ i ,Â j , andB since each element of the packed inputs is computed with an addition and a bit-shift operation with the packing factor, k.
Assuming no SDCs occur within output GEMM results, each packed outputr i orr j requires 11 arithmetic operations (including comparison operations) for unpacking [as elaborated in (16)- (23)] and an additional subtract and compare operation for error check (see Section III-B3). Therefore, (11L 2 /2) operations are required for the unpacking of the two (L/2) × (L/2) packed outputs,R i andR j , while L 2 operations are required for error checking. The final rowcolumn ABFT validation utilized by the proposed approach for the detection of certain pathological SDC cases would require 2L 2 −2L and L 2 +2L −1 operations for preprocessing and error check, respectively. In summary, assuming no SDCs occur, (1/2)(2L 3 + 15L 2 ) double bitwidth and 3L 2 − 1 single bitwidth arithmetic operations are required. By doubling the number of operations computed using the double bitwidth number representation, the number of operations is given by
To achieve the same protection for GEMM outputs using traditional ABFT, the row-column checksum would require 2L 2 − 2L addition operations for its computation, while the GEMM itself will be computed with 2L 3 +3L 2 −1 operations and the ABFT row & column checksum will be validated with 2L 2 +2L addition and comparisons. Therefore, assuming no SDCs occurred, the operations of traditional ABFT are given by
For mABFT, given that two checksum rows (and columns) are generated per partition size of 16, each unweighted checksum element would require 15 add operations for its computation while the corresponding weighted checksum element is computed with 31 arithmetic operations. Therefore, 46L operations are required for the checksum computation of each partition, and (L/16) partitions exist for each of the input matrices. In total, preprocessing for mABFT would require Finally, DMR does not require any pre-or postprocessing for its computation. However, 4L 3 − 2L 2 and L 2 arithmetic operations are performed for the computation of GEMM and error checking, respectively. Therefore, assuming no SDCs occurred, the complexity of DMR is
Combining (25)- (28) leads to the ratios reported in Proposition 1.
APPENDIX II PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof: Given the detection of x SDCs within the output GEMM results, the number of computations required by all algorithms for error correction is dependent on their location. We therefore calculate the operations required for error correction as the average of the worst-case and best-case SDC distribution in output GEMM results, where worst case refers to an SDC distribution requiring the highest number of operations and best case SDC distribution requires the least number of operations.
For numerical packing, the best case refers to the case of detection of an SDC in an output r i and its corresponding output r j , i.e., i = j . In such a case, our method of error correction recomputes (x/2) locations for each ofR i andR j , thereby requiring x(2L − 1) operations for all erroneous location recomputations, while 2 · 11 · (x/2) operations would be required for the unpacking of all x locations in both matrices (as each unpacking requires 11 operations).
On the other hand, the worst-case SDC distribution occurs when all x SDCs happen within either ofR i orR j . Given that any SDC detected for each r i or r j requires the recomputation of bothr i andr j of the failed location, 2x recomputations and unpackings will be required for this scenario, i.e., x(4L + 20) arithmetic operations.
By averaging between the two cases, the proposed approach requires (x/2)(6L +21) operations to correct x detected SDCs.
By doubling this result
Cx{x errors in proposed} = 2L 3 + 18L 2 − 1 + 6x L + 30x.
Concerning ABFT, assuming (for simplicity of exposition) that √ x is integer, the best-case SDC distribution for ABFT is having the SDCs located within a √ x × √ x square in the matrix. Therefore, provided the SDCs are all detectable, ABFT would flag √ x rows and columns as erroneous. When multiple SDCs are detected via ABFT, entire rows and columns that fail the checksum test are recomputed. The best-case SDC distribution of ABFT would therefore require a recomputation of √ x rows and √ x columns involving 2 √ x(2L 2 + L − 1) MAC operations.
On the other hand, if x is large (e.g., x ≥ 16), entire GEMM recomputation is more beneficial in practice in comparison to selective recomputation of multiple rows and columns. This is because the data access irregularity, in conjunction with the high percentage of outputs that are recomputed, ends up incurring higher execution time penalty in comparison to simply recomputing the GEMM. Therefore, the required operations for this case are
By averaging between the two cases Cx{x errors in ABFT} = 2L 3 + 7L 2 + 0.5 · [2L 3 + 3L 2 − 1]
The mABFT implementation presented in the paper can detect one SDC and correct two SDCs for each row or column within a partition. The best-case SDC distribution for this implementation would be having x SDCs spread in such a way that only one SDC occurs in a row or column of a partition. Since mABFT requires one division operation for error location and one subtraction operation for error correction [19] , [54] , 2x operations would be required in order to correct the x detected SDCs.
On the other hand, the worst-case error location in mABFT occurs when 4 SDCs occur within a 2 × 2 subblock in a partition such that two SDCs are detected in each of the two rows and columns corresponding to the subblock error location. Since the mABFT implementation in this work cannot correct more than one SDC per row/column, entire erroneous rows and columns of the affected partitions are recomputed. Thus, 4 · 18(2L − 1) arithmetic operations are required for the recomputation of two erroneous rows and two erroneous columns assumed to be spread across (x/4) different locations. Therefore, the overall complexity of mABFT including the correction of x SDCs is Cx{x errors in mABFT} = 1 64
Finally, performing the same analysis for DMR, the bestcase SDC distribution would refer to two SDCs occurring exactly at corresponding positions of the two GEMMs. This would require recomputation of (x/2) output locations. On the other hand, the worst-case SDC here refers to all x SDCs occurring at different locations of one of the GEMM outputs. In such a case, x locations would need to be recomputed for each of the output matrices. Therefore, the overall complexity of DMR (including the correction of x SDCs) is Cx{x errors in DMR} = 4L 3 − L 2 + 3x L − 1.5x. (32) Combining the last four equations leads to the ratios reported in Proposition 2.
